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Principal Findings 
What’s new? Two groups, Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh and Ansarul 
Islam, dominate Bangladesh’s jihadist landscape today. Attacks since 2013 have 
targeted secular activists, intellectuals and foreigners, as well as religious and 
sectarian minorities. The ruling Awami League has politicised the threat; its 
crackdowns on rivals undermine efforts to disrupt jihadist recruitment and 
attacks. 
Why did it happen? Bangladesh’s antagonistic politics have played a part in 
enabling the jihadist resurgence. The state confronted groups responsible for an 
earlier wave of violence with some success from 2004 to 2008. Subsequently, 
especially since controversial January 2014 elections, bitter political divisions 
have reopened space for new forms of jihadist activism. 
Why does it matter? A lull in violence over recent months may prove only a 
temporary respite. With elections approaching in December, politics could be-
come even more toxic. The government’s continued marginalisation of the oppo-
sition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and its forcing underground of opponents 
like Jamaat-e-Islami, risk sapping resources from efforts to disrupt jihadists. 
What should be done? Instead of relying on indiscriminate force, including 
alleged extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the government should 
adopt a counter-terrorism strategy anchored in reformed criminal justice and 
better intelligence gathering. Rather than cracking down on rivals, it should forge 
a broad social and political consensus on how to confront the threat. 
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Executive Summary 
As Bangladesh’s political polarisation reaches historic highs and local jihadist groups 
forge links with transnational movements, conditions are ripe for new forms of mili-
tancy that could threaten the country’s security and religious tolerance. Two groups, 
Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarul Islam, dominate today’s jihadist 
landscape; a faction of the former appears to have consolidated links to the Islamic 
State (ISIS) while the latter is affiliated with al-Qaeda’s South Asian branch. Both 
have perpetrated a string of attacks over the past few years, some targeting secular 
activists, others Bangladeshi minorities. The ruling Awami League has politicised the 
threat. Its crackdowns on political rivals sap resources from efforts to disrupt jihadist 
activities. Instead, it should invest in reinforcing the capability of the security forces 
and judiciary and build political consensus on how to tackle the threat.  
The country’s recent history of jihadism dates to the late 1990s, when veterans of 
the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan returned to Bangladesh. A first wave of vio-
lence, involving two groups, the Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh and the JMB, 
peaked on 17 August 2005, when the latter group synchronised bomb blasts in 63 of 
the country’s 64 districts. Successive governments subsequently took action against 
the JMB’s leadership, but the group has revived itself, albeit in a new form. Another 
group, Ansarul Islam (or Ansar), has also emerged, while a JMB splinter – dubbed 
the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” by law enforcement agencies – calls itself the 
Islamic State-Bangladesh and has funnelled fighters into Iraq and Syria.  
Ansar portrays itself as the defender of Islam from those who – in its leaders’ 
view – explicitly attack the religion. The JMB, on the other hand, has named a longer 
list of enemies: it considers perceived symbols of the secular state and anyone not 
subscribing to its interpretation of Islam as legitimate targets. The Bangladesh police 
allege that JMB operatives have played a part in attacks claimed by ISIS on promi-
nent members of minority communities and religious facilities and events, including 
Ahmadi mosques, Sufi shrines, Buddhist and Hindu temples, and Shia festivals. An 
attack on a Dhaka café on 1-2 July 2016 that killed over twenty people, mostly foreign-
ers, appears to have involved loose cooperation between different groups, including 
both rural-based madrasa students and elite urban young men.   
Bangladesh’s contentious national politics have played a role in enabling the 
jihadist resurgence. Ansar found its initial raison d’être in the Awami League gov-
ernment’s post-2010 trials of people accused of war crimes perpetrated in the 1971 
war of independence. Those trials, targeting the senior leadership of the largest 
Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), prompted criticism for violating due process, 
lacking transparency, and involving intimidation and harassment of defence lawyers 
and witnesses. The prosecutions were used to crush the JeI, a close ally of the Awami 
League’s main political rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and to dis-
credit the BNP itself. They provoked widespread anger among Islamists, which was 
mostly expressed through mass protest, not jihadist violence. Yet Ansar, depicting 
the trials as an assault on Islam, recruited urban, educated youth, albeit in relatively 
small numbers, and perpetrated brutal attacks on secular activists and bloggers who 
had demanded harsh punishment for those prosecuted.  
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Political polarisation has contributed to the growth of militancy in less direct 
ways, too. The marginalisation of the BNP through politically motivated corruption 
and other trials of its leadership, including party chief Khaleda Zia’s 8 February 2018 
conviction and five-year sentence for corruption, and of the JeI, through the war 
crimes trials and a ban on its participation in elections, have eliminated most demo-
cratic competition and encouraged the growth of a jihadist fringe. A purge of BNP 
and JeI sympathisers from the armed forces has elicited animosity within some mili-
tary circles toward the Awami League, which the jihadists also appear to be seeking 
to exploit. The BNP, for its part, has on occasion used terrible violence, or supported 
groups that do so, fuelling political animus and deepening schisms. 
The influx of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s 
Rakhine state in August-December 2017 also raises security concerns for Bangladesh. 
Jihadist groups – including ISIS and Pakistani militants – have referenced the Roh-
ingya’s plight in efforts to mobilise support. For now, though, little suggests that the 
refugees are particularly susceptible to jihadist recruitment. Bangladesh’s response 
to the humanitarian tragedy should focus primarily not on counter-terrorism but on 
providing support for refugees and redoubling efforts to assuage potential friction 
between them and host communities.  
The state response to the surge of jihadist violence over the past few years has 
relied primarily on blunt and indiscriminate force, including alleged enforced disap-
pearances and extrajudicial killings. Such tactics have eliminated large numbers of 
jihadists and weakened militant groups. But they undermine intelligence gathering. 
Security officials fear the ability of jihadist movements to recruit, raise funds and 
conduct operations remains intact. To make matters worse, Awami League leaders 
have exploited the threat to further discredit the BNP and JeI, accusing them of 
complicity in high-profile attacks. The government continues to use security forces 
to target its opponents, motivated, it appears, by the imperative of victory in the 
December 2018 general elections.  
While the past year has seen a lull in attacks, marginalising the mainstream polit-
ical opposition is likely to play into the hands of jihadist groups. Politicised, the police 
force and judiciary will continue to struggle with the detailed investigative work nec-
essary to disrupt networks that now tap not only madrasa students and their families 
in deprived rural areas but also privileged students in wealthier quarters of the capi-
tal. While the Awami League appears little inclined to do so ahead of this year’s vote, 
reversing the polarisation that creates an enabling environment for jihadists and 
building political consensus on how to tackle the problem, while investing in a pro-
fessional police and judiciary, are likely prerequisites of forestalling further jihadist 
violence. Without a change of course – and particularly if the December elections 
trigger a crisis similar to that around previous polls – the country could face another 
jihadist resurgence.  
Brussels, 28 February 2018 
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Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh 
I. Introduction  
Bangladesh faces a sustained threat from jihadist attacks.1 Since 2015, two jihadist 
groups, Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarul Islam (hereafter 
Ansar), have targeted foreigners, secular activists and intellectuals, religious and 
sectarian minorities, and other perceived opponents with rising frequency.2 These 
groups appear to be more integrated into transnational networks than earlier gener-
ations of jihadists. Yet their expansion is largely rooted in domestic political dynamics, 
which influence and inform state efforts against them. 
The bloody 1-2 July 2016 siege at a café in Dhaka’s upscale Gulshan neighbour-
hood, the heart of the diplomatic zone, forced domestic and international policy-
makers to reconsider the extent to which jihadist militancy had taken root in Bang-
ladesh. That three out of five alleged attackers belonged to Dhaka’s elite, not the 
madrasa sector more commonly associated with such jihadist militancy, suggests 
that the appeal of jihadism has spread and that jihadists may be able to tap a new 
constituency from which to recruit, even if thus far only in small numbers.3  
The report analyses the roots of Bangladesh’s jihadist groups, their goals, organi-
sational dynamics, recruitment patterns and links to regional and transnational 
networks. It is based on interviews conducted in April-August 2017 with security 
officials, the legal community, and political and civil society actors, including repre-
sentatives from Islamist parties and umbrella groups. Security risks inhibited access 
to jihadist groups and detainees; the report thus draws on their leaflets, online liter-
ature and public statements, and interviews with lawyers and law enforcement offi-
cials who have closely dealt with them. It proposes measures to counter the threat, 
based on analysis of the impact and effectiveness of the government’s response. Given 
the topic’s sensitivity, and an increasingly repressive environment in Bangladesh, 
most names have been withheld. 
 
 
1 For Crisis Group analysis of Bangladesh’s political and security dynamics, see Asia Reports N°s 277, 
Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh, 11 April 2016; 264, Mapping 
Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, 9 February 2015; 187, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bang-
ladesh, 1 March 2010; 182, Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track, 11 December 2009; 151, 
Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh, 28 April 2008; and 121, Bangladesh Today, 23 October 2006. 
2 “Ansar” in this case should not be confused with the Bangladesh Ansar, a volunteer paramilitary 
force under the home affairs ministry’s authority.  
3 For definitions of “jihadism” and “jihadist”, see Crisis Group Special Report N°1, Exploiting 
Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, 14 March 2016, p. 2. This report uses these terms in 
accordance with Crisis Group practice; in Bangladesh, however, the preferred terms are “Islamic 
militancy” and “Islamic militant”. 
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II. Genesis of Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh 
Jihadist militancy in Bangladesh began in the 1980s, when around 3,000 Bangla-
deshis reportedly joined the U.S. and Saudi-sponsored anti-Soviet jihad in Afghani-
stan.4 A first generation of Bangladeshi militants were veterans of that war. In 1992, 
a new group, Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh (also referred to as Harkat-ul 
Jihad), led by three Afghanistan veterans, Mufti Abdur Rouf, Mowlana Abdus Salam 
and Mufti Abdul Hannan Sheikh, declared that Bangladesh should become an Islamic 
state.5 The group, which operated from the Chittagong Hill Tracts bordering Myan-
mar, also aimed to aid the Rohingya Muslims in that country.6 A Harkat-ul Jihad 
leader, Fazlul Rahman, along with jihadist leaders from Pakistan and the Middle 
East, signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for jihad against the U.S. and its 
allies.7 In 1999, the group claimed a failed assassination attempt on Bangladesh’s 
leading poet, journalist and human rights activist Shamsur Rahman, and carried out 
a bomb attack at a cultural event in Jessore that killed ten people.8 
After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S., the group became more active 
under the leadership of Mufti Hannan, who had established strong links with Lash-
kar-e-Tayyaba in Pakistan.9 In February 2002, it attacked the American Center in 
Calcutta, killing four police constables and a security guard, and injuring over twenty 
in the first strike on a target in India. In May 2004, it attempted to assassinate the 
British high commissioner to Dhaka. Its deadliest action was the August 2004 gre-
nade attack on an election rally of then opposition leader and chief of the secular 
Awami League party, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, killing over twenty people; scores, in-
cluding Hasina herself, were injured.10 In addition to attacks in Sylhet Division, in 
the north east, and areas around Dhaka, the Harkat-ul Jihad also struck numerous 
times in southern locations such as Akhaura, Bagerhat and Khulna, mostly between 
1999-2005.11 
Founded in 1998, the JMB and its militant wing Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangla-
desh became active in the early 2000s, recruiting and training, raising funds, run-
ning outreach programs, and mobilising members across the north and in selected 
southern districts such as Chittagong, Jessore and Khulna. Its Dhaka-based leader 
 
 
4 Riaz Ali, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web (London, 2008). 
5 All three had reportedly fought under Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. Zayadul Ahsan 
and Pavitra Banavar, “Who are the militants?”, in Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair (eds.), Political 
Islam and Governance in Bangladesh (Oxford, 2011), pp. 71-90.  
6 For more on ties between Harkat-ul Jihad and the Myanmar insurgent group Rohingya Solidarity 
Organisation, see “How Southeast Asian and Bangladeshi extremism intersect”, Institute for Policy 
Analysis of Conflict, No. 37, 8 May 2017. 
7 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda’s Road to 9/11 (London, 2006). 
8 “Huji attacked poet Shamsur in ‘99”, The Daily Star, 30 November 2007; “Udichi observes 
Jessore tragedy day in city”, New Age, 7 March 2016. 
9 Crisis Group interview, senior retired military officer, Dhaka, June 2017. 
10 “3 HuJI activists held in Gujarat for Kolkata attack”, The Times of India, 16 February 2002; 
“British diplomat hurt in Bangladesh bombing”, The Telegraph, 21 May 2004. 
11 Home ministry’s internal report on militant organisations, provided to Crisis Group, June 2017. 
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Abdur Rahman also began establishing links with political powerbrokers willing to 
support his agenda.12  
Jagrata itself began as a vigilante group in north-eastern regions that had been 
the base of left-wing militants for decades. Khaleda Zia’s BNP-led government (2001-
2006) initially failed to take action against it, due to limited law enforcement capacity 
but also sympathy for these groups within Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), Bangladesh’s larg-
est Islamist party and a member of the BNP’s governing alliance.13 The animosity of 
the military and some BNP leaders toward India also drove them to patronise vari-
ous Islamist groups supporting insurgencies in India’s north-eastern provinces and 
Myanmar’s Rakhine state.14 Some government and police officials saw the JMB and 
Jagrata as useful tools against left-wing militants.15 Despite these reservations, domes-
tic and international pressure nudged the government to form, in 2004, an elite para-
military anti-crime and anti-terrorism unit, the Rapid Action Battalion, which in-
cludes military and police personnel.  
JMB’s 17 August 2005 countrywide coordinated and simultaneous attacks, involv-
ing over 459 low-intensity bombs, in all but one of Bangladesh’s 64 districts, killing 
two people and injuring around 100, proved a turning point.16 The subsequent secu-
rity crackdown, including trials and executions of top JMB members, forced the group 
into hiding. In the following years, its leaders described the synchronised 2005 
attack as a “sound blast” to draw attention to their message, contained in leaflets left 
at the bombing sites, which called for war against “Western imperial powers” and 
their local allies, including Bangladesh’s secular state. The judicial system was a par-
ticular target; there were several attacks on judges and court premises.17  
While JMB and Harkat-ul Jihad represented similar threats, and often operated 
in tandem, violently opposing Bangladesh’s secular traditions, there were fundamen-
tal differences. Harkat-ul Jihad drew on South Asian Islamic traditions, its ideo-
logical bent close to that of today’s Deobandi-inspired Hefazat-e-Islam, a hardline 
Islamist movement which over recent years has won concessions from the ruling party 
(see Section VII.B). Harkat-ul Jihad was largely based in the south, and it found its 
recruits in qaumi (privately run) madrasas. JMB, on the other hand, drew on the 
Wahhabi-inspired Ahl-e Hadith movement and was located mainly in the north east, 
though it also conducted outreach and recruitment drives in the south west, in Sat-
khira and Bagerhat districts.18  
 
 
12 Crisis Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, op. cit. 
13 Crisis Group Report, Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh, op. cit.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Officials involved in counter-terrorism efforts at the time confirmed that some members of the 
coalition government had actively promoted the militants, while police backed their anti-left opera-
tions. Crisis Group interviews, security officials and analysts, Dhaka, May-June 2017. Also see Cri-
sis Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, op. cit. 
16 “459 blasts in 63 districts in 30 minutes, 2 killed, 100 injured; all explosions were time bombs; 
Jamaat-ul Mujahideen leaflets found”, The Daily Star, 18 August 2005; “Bombs explode across 
Bangladesh”, BBC News, 17 August 2005. 
17 Crisis Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen, op. cit.  
18 Crisis Group interview, Shakhawat Hossain, Ahl-e Hadith Andolon Bangladesh spokesperson, 
Rajshahi, June 2017. The group claimed as its lineage, and the inspiration for its name, Islamist 
groups that had fought British colonialism in the early 19th century. Its base, in the north east, has 
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Increasingly bitter competition between the Awami League and BNP ahead of 
elections scheduled for January 2007 led to paralysing street violence and a political 
crisis, prompting a coup and military rule, between 2006 and 2008, behind the ve-
neer of a caretaker government.19 The military jailed much of the political class. The 
military-backed government redoubled counter-terrorism efforts, including through 
specialised trainings for law enforcement officials and anti-militancy messaging in 
the media and the state-run Islamic Foundation, as well as through Friday sermons 
in mosques across the country.20 It also tried some JMB leaders. Arrests and con-
victions of JMB and Harkat-ul Jihad members continued after the restoration of 
democracy and elections in December 2008, which returned the Awami League to 
office.21 By that time, the jihadist leadership appeared to have been dismantled and 
the security environment seemed much improved, leading law enforcement agencies 
to shift attention away from militant groups. 
 
 
also been the seat of the Ahl-e Hadith movement since 1994, when a former Rajshahi university 
professor, Asadullah Ghalib, formed an organisation he called Ahl-e Al Hadith.  
19 Following the bloody civil war that led to Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, the Awami League, 
led by Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman, formed the first government. In 1972, it enacted a constitution 
that, like the party’s founding ideology, drew on the principles of democracy, nationalism, socialism 
and secularism. Mujib and most of his family were killed by army personnel in the 15 August 1975 
coup. His daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, took over the leadership and remains the head of the 
Awami League. BNP leader Khaleda Zia is the wife of Bangladesh’s first military ruler, Major Gen-
eral Ziaur (Zia) Rahman (1977-1981), who created the party as a civilian proxy and alternative to the 
secular Awami League. Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit.  
20 The Bangladesh Islamic Foundation is a state-run organisation that supports research and schol-
arship on Islam and dissemination of “Islamic values”. “Combating extremism: Still relying mostly 
on force”, The Daily Star, 30 June 2017. 
21 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
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III. Setting the Stage for a Jihadist Resurgence 
A. Politicised Justice and an Islamist Backlash  
The Awami League came to power in January 2009 having promised an internation-
al war crimes tribunal to prosecute those responsible for atrocities during the 1971 
war of independence, a longstanding demand popular with the party’s voter base. 
Most of those expected to be tried were JeI members; others were from the BNP. The 
tribunal was established in 2010.  
While the quest for justice was legitimate, the trials were deeply flawed, lacking 
due process. They were also convenient tools for sidelining or eliminating rivals and 
rallying the Awami League’s political base. The convictions and executions that fol-
lowed provoked a domestic backlash; many of the accused had major followings, no-
tably among religiously conservative constituencies across the country. In particular, 
the 2013 death sentence for JeI leader Delwar Hossain Sayedee, a popular preacher, 
prompted violent countrywide demonstrations and clashes with police that left hun-
dreds of protesters dead. Islamists portrayed the trials as an attack on Bangladesh’s 
Muslim identity.22  
Secular activists mobilised, too, though to insist on harsher sentences. In February 
2013, after another JeI leader, Abdul Quader Mollah, was given life imprisonment, 
activists demonstrated in Dhaka’s Shahbagh square demanding a death sentence.23 
These protests, dubbed the Shahbagh movement, were led by urban, secular youth, 
including bloggers critical of the role of organised religion in Bangladesh’s secular 
polity. Islamists highlighted these opinions to discredit the movement as anti-Islam, 
demanding that Shahbagh organisers be punished.24  
The war crimes trials and the Shahbagh movement provided the backdrop for a 
new era of Islamist and jihadist activism. By 2013, JeI was on the defensive, with 
most of its top leaders on trial. Hefazat-e-Islam, a hitherto marginal umbrella organ-
isation sustained by qaumi (privately run) madrasas, stepped into the gap, quickly 
becoming a prominent socio-political force by channelling Islamist sentiment against 
the trials in large street demonstrations in late 2013. To defuse the protests, the gov-
ernment made concessions, including withdrawing plans to regulate the qaumi mad-
rasa sector.25 Hefazat also allegedly delivered the government a list of 84 bloggers 
and activists it wanted prosecuted and executed for making derogatory statements 
about Islam.26 
A new kind of jihadist mobilisation surfaced shortly thereafter. On 15 February 
2013, ten days after the Shahbagh demonstrations began, prominent blogger Ahmed 
Rajib Haider, whose writings had in part inspired those demonstrations, was brutally 
 
 
22 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
23 In response, the government repealed a law that prohibited appeals of war crimes trial verdicts. 
The high court resentenced Mollah, this time to death, in September 2013.  
24 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
25 Ibid. See also “Bangladesh’s radical Muslims uniting behind Hefazat-e-Islam”, The Guardian, 30 
July 2013. 
26 Amid the killings of bloggers, Hefazat officially denied association with this list. “Hefazat has no 
list of bloggers”, Prothom Alo, 25 May 2015. 
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murdered outside his home in Dhaka.27 A new group, the Ansarullah Bangla Team 
(later renamed Ansarul Islam), an affiliate of al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility. The 
following month, the group gave a thirteen-point list of demands to the government, 
including for a blasphemy law to try secular bloggers, marking a convergence in 
aspects of its agenda – though not its methods – with Hefazat.28  
B. Political Polarisation  
In addition to the flawed trials, Bangladesh’s deeply polarised politics and the increas-
ingly exclusionary bent of the Awami League-led government have contributed to 
the resurgence of militancy. In mid-2013, the Bangladeshi high court banned JeI from 
contesting forthcoming parliamentary elections on the grounds that an Islamist party 
running violated the secular constitution. Even if not a political ruling, this ban served 
to undercut a critical ally of the Awami League’s main rival, the BNP. It also led the 
JeI to resort to violence ahead of the January 2014 vote. As elections approached, the 
government pushed ahead with preparations despite the BNP’s objections; in the end, 
the BNP announced the day before the polls that it would boycott. Law enforcement 
agencies focused attention on opposition leaders and activists spearheading violent 
protests to subvert the election.29  
By the end of 2013, at least 500 people had been killed, making it the deadliest year 
of civil strife since Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan in 1971. The polls themselves, 
in January 2014, were likewise marred by violence. Given the BNP’s boycott, Bang-
ladesh’s parliament is almost bereft of opposition to the ruling party. A year later, a 
very violent campaign led by the BNP and JeI – replete with arson attacks on polling 
stations and assaults on policemen, as well as hartals (strikes) and transport block-
ades – marked the anniversary of those elections. This campaign, aimed at forcing 
fresh elections, provoked months of clashes, leaving around 150 people dead or 
missing. JeI activists were responsible for some of the worst attacks.30  
The BNP’s marginalisation from mainstream politics – part self-inflicted through 
its boycott and violent tactics; part due to the government’s rejection of its demands 
for electoral reforms – together with the government’s targeting of the JeI through 
the war crimes trials and electoral ban, created a major political vacuum. As law 
enforcement agencies focused on containing the Awami League’s political opponents, 
they failed to effectively counter the emergence of the Ansarul Islam and the re-
emergence, starting around mid-2014, of the JMB, which still had a nationwide net-
work of members recruited from qaumi madrasas, informants and sympathisers. 
 
 
27 Another prominent blogger Asif Mohiuddin survived a similar attack by militants a few weeks 
before the protests began. 
28 “Hefazat demands”, The Daily Star, 6 April 2013. 
29 These actions included countrywide hartals (strikes), demonstrations and traffic blockades that 
stalled economic activity and travel outside the urban centres. Awami League supporters and offi-
cials were also attacked in the run-up to and on election day. “Democracy in the crossfire: Opposi-
tion violence and government abuses in the 2014 pre- and post-election period in Bangladesh”, 
Human Rights Watch, April 2014. 
30 Crisis Group Report, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
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IV. Today’s Jihadist Landscape 
A. Ansarul Islam  
What had started as an online community reportedly inspired by the sermons of 
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen who joined al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch, al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian peninsula, gradually morphed into a group of young Bangladeshis following 
a fiery local preacher, Jashimuddin Rahmani, based in Dhaka’s Basila neighbour-
hood.31 Ansar soon began identifying itself, through online posts, as the Bangladesh 
chapter of al-Qaeda.32  
Beginning in 2013, Ansar prioritised killing liberal and secular bloggers, many of 
whom were reportedly on the Hefazat’s alleged list of 84 activists.33 In an online 
statement, Ansar said it was targeting writers, journalists, intellectuals and artists 
who publicly insulted Islam, rather than unbelievers who kept their views private.34 
In February 2015, Avijit Roy, a prominent U.S.-based blogger visiting Dhaka, was 
killed by machete-wielding assailants at a major book fair. In the course of the year, 
six more bloggers and two gay rights activists were similarly hacked to death, and 
four others injured, either in their homes or in public places, with all attacks claimed 
by Ansar.35 
Ansar is primarily urban-based. A well-informed source said many members 
do not know each other except through pseudonyms.36 Although it remains a small 
organisation, according to intelligence and counter-terrorism officials, Ansar has a 
formal structure that divides members into three groups, managed by a coordination 
team: dawa, which oversees logistics and recruitment; asqari, which oversees mili-
tary training; and a media wing run by IT experts that collates domestic and inter-
national coverage of the group.37 The group also includes a sub-group, mashul, which 
plans and oversees all attacks, while the foot soldiers executing operations are part 
of a subcategory called mamur.38 
Many of Ansar’s leaders and members appear to be well educated and Dhaka-
based. Rezwanul Azad Rana, a former activist from Shibir, the youth wing of the JeI, 
and a teaching assistant at North South, Dhaka’s largest private university, was re-
portedly one of the group’s first organisers and allegedly planned and oversaw the 
bloggers’ murders, before fleeing to Malaysia after law enforcement agencies learned 
 
 
31 Rahmani, currently serving a five-year sentence for the murder of blogger Rajib, appears to have 
come into contact with many future Ansar organisers, including the primary men accused in the mur-
der of Rajib, Rezwanul Azad Rana and Junoon Shikder, while serving as a cleric at a Dhaka mosque. 
Crisis Group interviews, counter-terrorism officials, Dhaka, May-June 2017. 
32 “Ansarullah Bangla team reorganised as Ansar-ul-Islam”, Protom Alo, 10 April 2016.  
33 “Fourth blogger hacked to death in Bangladesh”, The Wall Street Journal, 7 August 2015. 
34 “Ansar al-Islam Bangladesh lists categories of potential targets for killing”, SITE Intelligence 
Group, 29 May 2015: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/ansar-al-islam-bangladesh-
lists-categories-of-potential-targets-for-killing.html. 
35 “Behind killings in Bangladesh lies a brutal power struggle”, The Indian Express, 29 April 2016. 
36 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, June 2017. 
37 Crisis Group interviews, intelligence and counter-terrorism officials, Dhaka, June 2017. 
38 Crisis Group interview, well-informed source, Dhaka, June 2017.  
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of his role.39 Other members kept Ansar’s organisation intact and active after Rana’s 
departure. One was reportedly Junoon Shikder, another North South student, arrested 
in 2013 for alleged links with Ansar but released on bail a year later. He, too, fled to 
Malaysia, in 2014, whence he reportedly moved to Syria, suggesting he may have 
shifted his allegiance from al-Qaeda to ISIS.  
Since late 2015, the killings of bloggers have stopped. Many prominent online 
activists either have fled Bangladesh or keep a lower profile.40 Ansar itself appears to 
have faded from public attention, its appeal perhaps diminished in part because it 
arose in the context of the war crimes trials. With most high-profile Islamists accused 
of atrocities in 1971 convicted and some executed, the trials generate less immediate 
attention from the constituencies they initially outraged. Still, some security officials 
believe that Ansar and what the government calls the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” 
(discussed below) work closely together, contributing some of the 40 Bangladeshis 
who reportedly travelled to join ISIS in Syria.41  
Junoon and an unspecified number of other jihadists allegedly continue to oper-
ate Malaysia- and Singapore-based cells, which have been key to the transition of 
some Ansar members to ISIS, as well as to the facilitation of movement to Syria.42 
Three of the five alleged attackers in the 2016 Dhaka attack reportedly had operated 
in Ansar’s Malaysia cells for various durations, while four others, who were indirect-
ly involved, had also spent time in that country.43 Intelligence officials claim to regu-
larly discover communications between jihadists in Bangladesh and Malaysia- or 
Singapore-based Ansar cells during investigations.44 Ansar’s current threat level is 
difficult to gauge, given that the organisation seems to be moving on from its origi-
nal raison d’être, the war crimes trials, to a broader agenda. 
B. Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh 
There were initially clear distinctions between Ansar and JMB. Ansar members saw 
themselves primarily as defenders of Islam battling Western secular ideas, rather 
than fighting for an Islamic state. The group’s targets were limited to those it consid-
ered to have insulted the faith. Most Ansar leaflets that investigators recovered at 
 
 
39 Security officials said they first learned about Rana from U.S. intelligence contacts who had ob-
tained information about him from a former North South student who is now serving a 30-year 
term in a U.S. federal prison. Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Dhaka, May-June 2017. See 
also “Blogger Rajib killing: convicted Rana hiding in Malaysia”, The New Age, 22 January 2016; 
“Blogger Rajib murder mastermind arrested”, Dhaka Tribune, 20 February 2017; Sajjan Gohel, 
“The nexus of local and international extremist groups in Bangladesh”, South Asia@LSC blog, 22 
July 2016.  
40 “Living in fear away from home”, The Hindu, 17 May 2016. Investigators and prosecutors have 
made little progress on the cases of the bloggers’ killings. 
41 Crisis Group interviews, counter-terrorism officials, Dhaka, May-June 2017. 
42 “How Southeast Asian and Bangladeshi extremism intersect”, Institute for Policy Analysis of 
Conflict, Report No. 37, 8 May 2017. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Dhaka, May-June 2017. See also “Singapore says 
arrests 27 Bangladeshi Islamists, deports 26”, Reuters, 20 January 2016.  
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attack sites emphasised that the organisation was not at war with peoples of other 
faiths unless they slighted or undermined Islam.45  
In contrast, JMB since its founding almost two decades ago, and again in its re-
cent resurgence, has pursued the establishment of Islamic law and perceived anyone 
not subscribing to its interpretation of Islam, including religious and sectarian minori-
ties, as well as non-Muslim foreigners, as legitimate prey. Thus, while Ansar targeted 
only individuals such as Bangladeshi secular and liberal bloggers, JMB, both as a 
whole and, later, a faction more closely identified with ISIS (discussed below), focused 
on Bangladesh’s minority communities, attacking Ahmadi mosques, Sufi shrines, 
Buddhist and Hindu temples, and Shia festivals, as well as prominent members of 
these communities. While ISIS claimed some of these attacks, police suspect a JMB 
role in executing them.46 Since 2015, JMB has expanded its activities beyond its tra-
ditional strongholds in the north and south west, and conducted attacks countrywide, 
including in Dhaka, where it was responsible – at least partly though perhaps entirely 
– for the 2016 attack.  
At the outset, the outfit had four tiers, each defined by level of responsibility and 
commitment to the organisation: majlis-e-shura, a consultative decision-making 
council directly under the amir, or chief; ehsar, or full-time members; gayeri ehsar, 
or part-time activists; and sudhis (well-wishers) and saathis (comrades). In princi-
ple, JMB’s organisational structure included a military wing, comprised entirely of 
ehsar (the other sections made up the non-military wing). This wing was meant to 
include six divisions, each with a chief and deputy, and four sectors – ordnance, 
operations, intelligence and medical – but it was never fully operationalised. Each 
sector was also meant to have subdivisions. For example, explosives, electronics 
technology, weapons collection and stockpiling fell under ordnance; guerrillas and 
fedayeen (suicide attackers) under operations.47  
Today, the majlis-e-shura reportedly has seven members. It approves all attacks 
and killings. The current amir, Salauddin, oversees regional commanders and brigades, 
which have both dawa, or logistics and recruitment, and military wings.48 In a recent 
interview, Salauddin said the group was expanding its network beyond Bangladesh, 
although it is difficult to assess the veracity of this claim; despite ties to militants 
elsewhere, the JMB itself has never perpetrated an attack outside Bangladesh.49  
According to counter-terrorism officials, the group recruits not just young men, 
but entire families, including women.50 They claim that recruiters also are attempt-
ing to attract youth in regions outside Dhaka that are politically volatile and have a 
 
 
45 “Ansar al-Islam Bangladesh lists categories of potential targets for killing”, SITE Intelligence 
Group, 29 May 2015: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/ansar-al-islam-bangladesh-
lists-categories-of-potential-targets-for-killing.html. 
46 “Tavella shot dead by ‘Neo-JMB’”, The Daily Star, 22 October 2016. 
47 Crisis Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen, op. cit.  
48 Crisis Group interviews, counter-terrorism and intelligence officials, Dhaka, June 2017. 
49 “Jamaatul Mujahideen amir Shaikh Salahuddin – special interview”, Sahm Al Hind Media, 13 
May 2017. 
50 Several JMB hideouts raided in March and April 2017 were homes where most household mem-
bers were allegedly involved in jihadist militancy in some capacity. The group has recruited entire 
families since its early days. “The family network of militants”, Samakal, 14 August 2016. See also 
Crisis Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen, op. cit.  
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large conservative base, including the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Noakhali, Lakshmipur 
and Chapainababganj.51 
C. “Neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” and ISIS 
Since the 2016 Dhaka attack, law enforcement officials began using the term “neo-
Jamaat-ul Mujahideen”. Some analysts argue they use this term to obscure ISIS’s 
role in Bangladesh, and that many ISIS members are described by security officials 
as “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen”.52 In an interview, JMB’s current amir, Salahuddin, 
dismissed the term as an invention of “infidels”. He did, however, acknowledge that 
some members had joined ISIS.53 
The “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” faction – which refers to itself as Islamic State 
Bangladesh – was thought to be led by a Canadian-Bangladeshi, Tamim Chowdhury, 
until his August 2016 death in an alleged extrajudicial killing. The faction was divid-
ed by geographic region, with each regional unit led by a commander who focused 
on operational activities endorsed by the central leadership. Several regional com-
manders have been killed in Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi and points further north. 
The structure that Chowdhury headed appears to have been dismantled but counter-
terrorism officials say it has splintered into smaller cells that, for now, conduct fewer 
coordinated operations.54  
In the run-up to the 2016 Dhaka attack, Chowdhury reportedly played a pivotal 
role in bringing together Ansar, a section of JMB’s network still active in northern 
districts and the south east, and individuals acting on behalf of ISIS in Bangladesh 
and Syria. Counter-terrorism officials believe he was the primary coordinator between 
ISIS and Bangladeshi jihadist groups.55 Chowdhury concentrated his recruitment 
efforts in Dhaka’s Banani neighbourhood and cantonment area, possibly tapping 
into discontent inside the army (discussed below). He also established contact with 
young extremists who provided access to youth studying at coaching centres.56 Many 
suspected militants detained or killed in security raids since July 2016 were young 
boys from affluent backgrounds who had months earlier left home; the “neo-Jamaat-
ul Mujahideen” appears to be mining a similar demographic to Ansar, in other words.57 
Even earlier, in 2015, Bangladeshi intelligence and security agencies uncovered 
communications between local jihadists and Bangladeshi fighters in Syria, though 
they could not decode much of the content. In a Chittagong raid, officials also dis-
covered an ISIS flag and evidence of communication among JMB members arguing 
in favour of joining ISIS.58 ISIS also began claiming responsibility for several attacks 
 
 
51 Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Dhaka and Chittagong, May-June 2017. 
52 Crisis Group interviews, security analysts and journalists, Dhaka, May 2017. 
53 “Jamaatul Mujahideen amir Shaikh Salahuddin – special interview”, Sahm Al Hind Media, 13 
May 2017; “Living in fear away from home”, The Hindu, 17 May 2016. 
54 Crisis Group interviews, counter-terrorism, intelligence officials, Dhaka, June 2017. 
55 Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Dhaka, June 2017. 
56 These are informal evening schools at private residences or rented school premises, where teach-
ers give private tutorials mostly to O and A level students. Crisis Group interview, senior intelli-
gence official, Dhaka, June 2017. 
57 “Where have the rest of the missing people gone?”, Dhaka Tribune, 4 April 2017. 
58 Crisis Group interviews, counter-terrorism officials, Dhaka, Chittagong, June 2017. 
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in Bangladesh – including the 2016 Dhaka attack – on social media. The October 
2015 issue of Dabiq, ISIS’s monthly magazine, contained a special story on Bangla-
desh, praising earlier JMB exploits. Saifullah Ozaki, a Bangladeshi who formerly was 
an associate professor in Kyoto, reportedly played a key role through an online plat-
form in recruiting Bangladeshis to ISIS and arranging their travel to Syria. There 
have been claims he may today even be the leader of the JMB faction – the “neo-
Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” – that is more closely identified with ISIS.59 
According to Bangladeshi counter-terrorism officials, local jihadists began using 
ISIS propaganda to appeal to middle- and upper middle-class youth, and inducting 
former activists from Hizb-ut Tahrir, a pan-Islamist missionary movement that 
rejects jihadist violence, and retired military personnel.60 By the time of the 2016 
Dhaka attack, some Ansar and JMB elements appear to have also formally pledged 
allegiance to the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.61  
Many security and counter-terrorism experts believe that a new generation of ji-
hadists, earlier linked to JMB or Ansar, now identifies more directly with ISIS than 
with purely homegrown entities.62 The government, however, refuses to acknowledge 
an ISIS presence in Bangladesh. Some police officials contend that acknowledgment 
of such a presence would be too politically costly at a time when the government 
claims counter-terrorism successes.63  
 
 
59 “How JMB evolved to ‘Neo JMB’”, BDNews24.com, 17 August 2016; “Islamic State claims they 
now have a regional commander in Bangladesh”, BDNews24.com, 23 November 2015; “Bangla-
deshi who taught at Ritsumeikan among 10 suspects wanted by police over Dhaka attack: sources”, 
The Japan Times, 21 July 2016. 
60 Crisis Group interview, counter-terrorism official, directorate general of forces intelligence, Dha-
ka, June 2017. Hizb-ut Tahrir is a transnational Islamist proselytising organisation that is banned 
in Bangladesh.  
61 “Glimpses into ‘jihadi’ minds”, The Daily Star, 2 August 2016. 
62 Crisis Group interviews, law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials, Dhaka, May-June 2017. 
63 Crisis Group interviews, senior police and other security officials, Dhaka, Chittagong, April-June 
2017. 
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V. Flashpoints 
A. Resentment in the Military 
Soon after it assumed office in 2009, the Awami League faced a mutiny by personnel 
from the Bangladesh Rifles, a border security force. Around 74 people were killed, 
including senior counter-terror officials and 57 army officers. The consequences of 
the insurrection, including a subsequent shakeup that saw several officers removed 
or reassigned, continue to reverberate within an institution that has held the levers 
of political power for seventeen of Bangladesh’s 46 years as a state.64 
In November 2009, five serving and six former army officers were detained in the 
attempted murder of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s nephew, Awami League par-
liamentarian Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh. In January 2012, the army detained twelve 
officers for an alleged coup attempt. Although none was tried, most were dismissed 
on various grounds, most often indiscipline. Estimates of the number of officers 
sacked or forced into retirement since 2009 vary from 50 to 250.65 Many former 
officers, and even an adviser to Hasina at that time, believe the Bangladesh Rifles 
mutiny was used as a pretext by the Awami League government to restructure the 
army and purge it of more conservative pro-JeI and BNP elements that oppose the 
Awami League’s secularism.66  
To quell further dissent and unrest among officers and soldiers, the government 
offers financial incentives: salary hikes, budget increases and lucrative government 
contracts to military-controlled entities involved in housing, transport and major 
infrastructure projects.67 While these concessions may have yielded a less interven-
tionist military in the short term, the aftereffects of the mutiny and the subsequent 
purges, which one former general officer described as “both a physical and psycho-
logical scar”, may have pushed a small number of his colleagues toward jihadism.68  
One of the officers implicated in the 2012 attempted coup, Major Syed Ziaul 
Hoque, reportedly became Ansar’s military commander.69 Several young men living 
in residential quarters for former army officers were arrested in 2015 for attempting 
to establish ties to ISIS.70 The same year, a counter-terrorism official claimed that 
law enforcement officials had found military training manuals and military-issued 
 
 
64 In November 2013, a special court, trying 850 persons, including 23 civilians, for involvement in 
the 33-hour coup attempt, condemned 152 to death and 162 to life imprisonment. “8 years on, grue-
some BRD mutiny still in memory”, Dhaka Tribune, 25 February 2017; “Real cause of BDR mutiny 
still a mystery”, Dhaka Tribune, 25 February 2014; “Death to 152 in Bangladesh Rifles mutiny case”, 
The Hindu, 5 November 2013. 
65 “Bangladesh military foils coup plot”, The Guardian, 19 January 2012; “The armed forces in four 
years of alliance rule: 197 dismissed, 161 left job”, Prothom Alo, 26 May 2013.  
66 Crisis Group interviews, former army officers, Dhaka, June-July 2017. See also Crisis Group Report, 
Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
67 “Project areas includes flood zone”, The Daily Star, 29 October 2010; Crisis Group Report, Map-
ping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, op. cit. 
68 Crisis Group interview, senior former army officer, August 2017. 
69 “Homegrown militants and ex-major behind Bangladesh attacks, police say”, Reuters, 30 June 
2016. 
70 Crisis Group interview, official, Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime Unit (CTTC), Chit-
tagong, June 2017. 
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uniforms and bullets during a 2015 raid of a jihadist hideout in Chittagong.71 Jihadist 
organisations are clearly trying to tap into military disgruntlement.  
B. The Rohingya Crisis 
Much as discontent in the military provides opportunities that jihadists might exploit, 
so too could the Rohingya crisis.72 A brutal military campaign against the Rohingya 
in late 2017, following an attack on security personnel by the militant group, Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA, also called Harakah al-Yaqin) in the north of My-
anmar’s Rakhine state, forced close to 700,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh.73 
The Awami League government’s response has included confinement of Rohingyas 
to camps in border regions and diplomacy aimed at ensuring the refugees’ return, 
including through a late November repatriation agreement. Such efforts appear 
unlikely to bear fruit, given the Myanmar authorities’ uncompromising stance and 
because conditions in Rakhine state are not conducive to refugees returning in a safe 
and sustainable manner.74 
The Rohingya influx has significant security ramifications for Bangladesh, though 
the challenge for Bangladeshi authorities is to assess the dangers accurately and adopt 
a measured and sensible response. A large, stateless population with slim prospects 
of returning to Myanmar any time soon places enormous strain on authorities and 
host communities, raising the potential for friction between refugees and the local 
population.  
That said, clearly it would be counterproductive – even offensive – to portray the 
long-suffering Rohingya community, for many of whom the past few months have 
brought unimaginable horrors, as jihadists in waiting. Some reports suggest that a 
small number from the refugee camps have joined the ARSA, though that group re-
mains focused on Myanmar; as yet no evidence suggests it has ties to transnational 
jihadism.75 In the past, militant Rohingya groups had small bases in Bangladeshi ter-
ritories and one, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, collaborated with Jamaat-ul 
Mujahideen on weapons and explosives training; and some counter-terrorism ana-
lysts believe that Ansar might be training and arming Rohingya militants today.76  
 
 
71 “Arrested youth, Galib, planned to set up Islamic State like organization in Bangladesh”, Ittefaq, 
31 May 2015; Crisis Group interview, CTTC official, Chittagong, June 2017. 
72 “Bangladesh says to meet with Myanmar on Rohingya trapped at border”, Reuters, 19 February 
2018. For more on the Rohingya crisis, see Crisis Group Statement, “The Rakhine State Danger to 
Myanmar’s Transition”, 8 September 2017.  
73 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°292, Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New 
Phase, 7 December 2017.  
74 The tenor of long-running discussions between the two countries on the subject suggests that this 
effort is unrealistic, as do Myanmar’s deliberately rigid standards and the continuing crackdown on 
and isolation of Rohingya communities. “Bangladesh agrees with Myanmar to complete Rohingya 
return in two years”, Reuters, 16 January 2018; “Number of refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh 
up to 480,000: Agencies”, Reuters, 25 September 2017; “‘Textbook example of ethnic cleansing’: 
370,000 Rohingyas flood Bangladesh as crisis worsens”, The Washington Post, 12 September 2017. 
75 Crisis Group Report, Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase, op. cit.  
76 Crisis Group interview, Munir Ahmed, press secretary to Allama Shah Ahmed Shafi, amir, Hefazat-
e-Islam, Chittagong, May 2017. “Annual threat assessment”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Assess-
ments, vol. 9, no. 1 (January 2017). For background on the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and its 
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Certainly, too, regional and transnational jihadist networks have shown interest 
in exploiting the Rohingyas’ plight. An April 2016 issue of Dabiq, ISIS’s online mag-
azine, included a Bangladeshi ISIS commander sounding a rallying cry to fight for 
Rohingya rights. Al-Qaeda had included Myanmar on a 2014 list of key targets, and 
in December 2016 its Bengali media output included a video call to arms to avenge 
the persecution of Arakan Muslims. In a mid-September 2017 article in the Pakistan-
based Jaish-e-Mohammed’s main publication, Masood Azhar, its leader, wrote: “All 
Muslims of the world must unite for this cause. We have to do something and do it 
urgently. Myanmar’s soil is earnestly waiting for the thumping sound of the foot-
steps of the conquerors”.77 Akayed Ullah, the Bangladeshi immigrant who detonated 
a pipe bomb in a New York subway corridor on 11 December 2017, had visited the 
Rohingya camps three months earlier.78 That said, jihadists have long drawn atten-
tion to the suffering of Muslims around the world – including, for example, that of 
the Palestinians – to inspire attacks yet frequently this tactic does not translate into 
jihadist inroads into the conflicts in question.  
Clearly, Bangladeshi authorities must remain alert to such dangers. Overall, 
though, their response to the Rohingya crisis should involve less counter-terrorism 
than humanitarian provision for a traumatised refugee population. They should con-
centrate as well on preventing and containing friction between Rohingyas and host 
communities.  
 
 
ties to Bangladeshi militancy, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°283, Myanmar: A New Muslim In-
surgency in Rakhine State, 15 December 2016; and The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen, op. cit.  
77 “Myanmar’s Buddhist leader is a coward, unlike bin Laden”, Daily Times, 12 September 2017; 
“Militant outfits look to cash in on Rohingya crisis”, Dhaka Tribune, 13 September 2017.  
78 “Akayed visited Kutupalong Rohingya camp in October”, Dhaka Tribune, 14 December 2017; “A 
mysterious act of mercy by subway bombing suspect”, The New York Times, 18 December 2017. 
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VI. The State’s Response 
A. Blunt Force 
Since the 2016 Dhaka attack, law enforcement agencies have raided numerous jihadist 
hideouts in different parts of the capital, neighbouring Narayanganj and Gazipur, 
Chittagong, as well as in the north. Yet many counter-terrorism operations seem 
focused on killing those suspected of involvement with jihadist networks, rather than 
disrupting or dismantling those networks and countering their influence.79 Some of 
these killings reportedly have been staged as “fake encounters” or gun battles between 
militants and police in which militants are killed.80 
Odhikar, a Bangladeshi human rights organisation, estimates that there have been 
as many as 2,000 such killings since 2001 by the Rapid Action Battalion and police, 
with 128 in 2016 and 154 in 2017. This group also says at least 330 people, including 
alleged militants as well as opposition BNP and JeI members, have disappeared 
since the Awami League government came to office in 2009.81 Many others have 
been detained for long periods without charge. Among the latter category were two 
survivors of the 2016 Dhaka attack, Hasnat Karim and Tahmid Hasib. Family mem-
bers claimed that law enforcement personnel had apprehended them from their 
homes without warrants after images/videos of supposedly suspicious behaviour 
during the siege emerged on social media. Hasib was detained for almost a year before 
being released without charge; Karim remains in custody, charged with involvement 
in the attack, though officials have provided few details.82 
Since the 2016 attack, the Dhaka metropolitan police’s Counter Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime Unit, rather than the Rapid Action Battalion, has been given 
the counter-terrorism lead, a shift in authority that aims, according to officials, to 
build specialised counter-terrorism expertise in the force. But instead of using in-
telligence for operations aimed at dismantling jihadist groups, the state’s response 
continues to consist mostly of killing suspected militants, as is evident in recent raids 
in Comilla, Chittagong, Sylhet, Rajshahi and elsewhere.83 A district police official 
acknowledged that extrajudicial killings were common.84  
 
 
79 For example, a month after the Dhaka attack, police raided an apartment in the densely populat-
ed Kalyanpur neighbourhood, claiming that nine militants had been killed in a standoff. Since no 
police were injured, many in the media speculated that the encounter was staged. Similarly, in August 
2016, the police claimed to have killed the alleged mastermind of the 2016 Dhaka attack, Tamim 
Chowdhury, and two accomplices in a gun battle. But there were allegations that Chowdhury had 
been in police custody for at least two weeks before the supposed encounter. “9 militants killed in 
Dhaka hideout”, The Daily Star, 27 July 2016; “Extremism suspect killed in Lalbagh police raid”, 
New Age, 11 September 2016. 
80 “Bangladesh: End disappearance and secret detentions”, Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2017. 
81 See the following Odhikar publications: “Crossfire/gunfight from 2001-2007”; “Bangladesh: an-
nual human rights report 2016” (undated); “Enforced disappearance 2009-2017 February” (March 
2017); and “Bangladesh: annual human rights report 2017” (January 2018), p. 30. 
82 David Bergman, “Bangladesh’s secret detentions: The case of the two Dhaka attack hostages”, 
The Wire, 12 August 2016. 
83 “New JMB Rajshahi military chief killed in gunfight”, Dhaka Tribune, 3 March 2017. 
84 Crisis Group interview, Chandpur, June 2017. 
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Many government and law enforcement officials believe the criminal justice sys-
tem incapable of dealing effectively with terrorism cases, as delays and prolonged 
trials often end without convictions while militants recruit and proselytise in prisons. 
A former Rapid Action Battalion official claimed that jailed militants established 
protection rackets for petty criminals, whom they eventually recruit.85 A prison offi-
cial suggested that prisons employ Islamic scholars: “I find myself at sea trying to 
argue religion with [detained] militants, who know a lot more about Islam than I do. 
How am I meant to prevent radicalisation here?”86  
Circumvention of the criminal justice system is clearly the wrong response, how-
ever. It undermines the state’s legitimacy, sows fear and mistrust between authori-
ties and communities, and risks provoking a violent backlash. The culture of im-
punity it breeds also erodes professionalism in the security forces and in some cases 
appears to have encouraged other forms of criminality. Some members are involved 
in contract killings and kidnappings for ransom; in 2014, a spate of murders in 
Narayanganj involved top Rapid Action Battalion officials including a former army 
lieutenant colonel.87 
Human rights activists argue that the culture of impunity around enforced disap-
pearances and unlawful detention has a lasting impact on victims and their families 
and undercuts the government’s internal security objectives.88 Extrajudicial killings 
feed jihadist propaganda about injustice; Ansar has shared images of those killed dur-
ing the 2013 Hefazat protests through its Telegram channel to entice new recruits.89  
Some law enforcement officials also express concern that killing rather than 
apprehending militants wastes opportunities to obtain vital intelligence. A security 
official contended that a killing in 2015 in which he was involved might have cost law 
enforcement agencies an opportunity to uncover planning for and disrupt the 2016 
Dhaka attack.90 Other security officials said the killing of captured militants prevent-
ed investigation of suspected cells, including in regions close to Bangladesh’s border 
with India.91 Inadequate investigations and questioning of arrested militants may 
lead to similarly squandered opportunities. A prominent human rights activist argued, 
for example, that more thorough investigations of arrested militants’ involvement 
in earlier attacks on foreigners could have yielded intelligence about impending 
attacks, including that same Dhaka attack.92 
 
 
85 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, June 2017. 
86 Crisis Group interview, district jail official, Chandpur, June 2017. 
87 In April 2014, seven people, including a Naranyanganj city councillor and a lawyer, were abduct-
ed and killed. At least 27 RAB officials, including three top officials seconded from the army, were 
found responsible for the contract killing commissioned by a rival politician of the ruling party. 
“7-murder: Nur Hossain, RAB commander Tareque, 24 others get death”, The Daily Star, 16 Janu-
ary 2017. 
88 Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, August 2017. 
89 Crisis Group review of Ansar posts on social media app Telegram, September 2017.  
90 Crisis Group interviews, security officials, Dhaka, June-August 2017. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Crisis Group interviews, counter-terrorism officials, Chittagong, June 2017; Nur Khan Liton, 
human rights activist, Dhaka, August 2017. 
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B. Following the Money 
Jihadist groups raise funds from multiple sources. Militants’ families apparently con-
tribute considerable sums for individual attacks, to hide and train operatives, and to 
acquire weapons. Zakat, obligatory Islamic alms for the poor, was a major funding 
source for the previous generation of jihadists and is still tapped by such groups.93  
Bangladesh’s long, porous borders with India and Myanmar pose particular chal-
lenges to countering the flow of illicit funds, some of which may end up bankrolling 
jihadist operations. Indeed, Bangladesh is “a trans-shipment point for drugs pro-
duced in both the ‘golden triangle’ of Southeast Asia and ‘golden crescent’ of Central 
Asia”.94 According to a former senior security official, jihadist outfits also depend on 
forged Indian currency from Pakistan.95 Individuals as well as organisations from 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular fund madrasas and mosques across Bangla-
desh, with some of the money apparently finding its way to jihadist groups.96 
Particularly vexing is the jihadist use of hundi, an informal domestic and interna-
tional money transfer mechanism. For the most part, this mechanism is benign: an 
estimated six million Bangladeshis working in the Middle East and South East Asia 
send home about $12-15 billion annually, about half of it through hundi.97 But JMB 
has long run its own hundi operations that provide both profits and a secure method 
of moving funds.98 Moving small sums over time is a simple way of evading detection. 
The central bank, Bangladesh Bank, has had marginal success in screening these 
transfers. More promising are its attempts to make more attractive the use of regular 
banking channels for remittances.  
The government has taken steps to counter money laundering and terrorist financ-
ing. The 2009 Anti-Terrorism Act empowered Bangladesh Bank to freeze accounts 
and take other actions to curb criminal activity. The Money Laundering Prevention 
Act of 2012 and 2013 amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act lengthened the list of 
money laundering offenses and expanded the categories of reporting entities, while 
widening the scope of legal sanctions. The 2012 Mutual Legal Assistance Act aimed 
to strengthen international cooperation efforts. And Bangladesh became a member 
of the Asia Pacific Group on money laundering in July 2013.  
These efforts have met with international approval. In February 2014, the inter-
national Financial Action Task Force removed Bangladesh from its “grey list” which 
includes “jurisdictions with strategic AML [Anti-Money Laundering]/CFT [Combat-
ting the Financing of Terrorism] deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress 
 
 
93 Crisis Group interviews, serving and retired security officials, Dhaka, June 2017; “A year after 
Gulshan attack, police are still looking for five fugitives”, Dhaka Tribune, 1 July 2017; and Crisis 
Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen, op. cit. 
94 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. State Department, 2014. 
95 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, June 2017. 
96 Crisis Group Report, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen, op. cit.; “Militant funding: 17 for-
eign NGOs under intel surveillance”, Dhaka Tribune, 19 July 2017. See also “Saudi Arabia giving 
$20 million for Bangladesh mosques”, BDNews24.com, 26 September 2017. 
97 “Overseas employment remittances from 1976 to 2017”, Bureau of Manpower, Employment and 
Training, Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment, Government of Bangladesh: 
http://www.bmet.gov.bd/BMET/stattisticalDataAction.  
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in addressing the deficiencies”,99 and an October 2016 Asia Pacific Group assess-
ment noted significant improvement in compliance with international anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards.100 It also found that the Bang-
ladesh Bank’s Financial Intelligence Unit effectively disseminated information to law 
enforcement and other agencies. The 2017 Basel anti-money laundering index, pub-
lished by the Switzerland-based Babel Institute on Governance, ranked Bangladesh 
second in South Asia behind India.101 
Bangladeshi authorities now need to get better at investigating and prosecuting 
complex financial crimes. The state has won very few money laundering and terror-
ist financing convictions, though hundreds of cases are pending.102 Law enforcement 
agencies lack the capacity to collate and understand financial intelligence, including 
that gathered by the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit, and at making use of 
that intelligence in their investigations.103 
C. Politicising Counter-terrorism 
Rather than building political consensus on the threat posed by jihadist groups and 
how to tackle it, Prime Minister Hasina’s government has more often exploited the 
militants’ attacks to discredit the opposition. Awami League leaders accuse the BNP 
of assisting militants when it was in office from 2001-2006; some of them go so far 
as to accuse it of involvement in high-profile jihadist attacks since 2015.  
Condemning the 2016 Dhaka attack, Hasina blamed those who “have resorted to 
terrorism after failing to win the hearts of people democratically”, a thinly veiled ref-
erence to the BNP and its JeI allies.104 Even before the investigation into the August 
2015 murder of Italian national Cesare Tavella started, Hasina pointed to the BNP 
and JeI; three weeks later the home minister, without evidence, named a BNP leader 
as the murder’s mastermind.105 In October 2016, a year after police had charged sev-
en people, including a mid-ranking BNP member, for that murder, the Rapid Action 
Battalion held JMB responsible. Even now that internal government documents 
attribute the killing to the “neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen” and nothing suggests the 
BNP member who has been charged has ties to that group, his trial continues.106  
Notwithstanding the BNP’s mixed record of combatting militancy while in office 
in the 2000s, the governments’ accusations of BNP support for such groups today 
 
 
99 FATF website, www.fatf-gafi.org. 
100 “Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Bangladesh”, Mutual Evalu-
ation Report, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, October 2016; Basel AML Index Report, 
Basel Institute of Governance, 16 August 2017.  
101 Ibid.  
102 “Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Bangladesh”, op. cit. 
103 Ibid. 
104 “PM blames it on local, int’l quarters”, The Daily Star, 3 July 2016. 
105 Hasina was quoted as saying that the BNP and Jamaat have “definitely abetted these murders in 
an attempt to overshadow Bangladesh’s achievements”. “Hasina accused ‘BNP-Jamaat’ of killing 
foreigners in Bangladesh”, BDNews24.com, 4 October 2015. 
106 Internal government documents provided to Crisis Group. “Tavella shot dead ‘by neo JMB’”, The 
Daily Star, 22 October 2016; “Bangladesh minister accuses BNP man of Italian’s murder”, Eco-
nomic Times, 28 October 2015; “Bangladesh PM Hasina smells link of BNP-Jamaat”, The Daily 
Star, 5 October 2015.  
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have little credibility and serve mainly as a way for the ruling party to tarnish its 
principal political rival. Similar accusations against JeI are equally politicised, as 
evidenced by the measures taken to force the party from politics and its base almost 
entirely underground. With the JeI weakened and many senior leaders executed fol-
lowing the war crimes trials, there is a risk that some supporters throw in their lot 
with harder-line groups, as avenues to pursue goals peacefully close. 
The party’s student wing, Shibir, was once a key source of recruits for JMB, whose 
founder Shaikh Abdur Rahman was a Shibir member. One senior counter-terrorism 
official claimed that several former leaders of Shibir, which has a long history of vio-
lence, have joined jihadist organisations in recent years. It is, however, difficult to 
assess government and even nominally independent analysts’ claims of links between 
JeI and jihadists, particularly given the repression the JeI has suffered over the past 
years and the partisan agendas of many domestic observers.107 Leaders of JeI and its 
student wing deny allegations that party members have turned to jihadism, scorning 
those charges as a government conspiracy to discredit the party.108 A Shibir leader 
said: “Judicial commissions had been formed in the past to find our links to militan-
cy and found nothing”.109 Yet suppressing the largest Islamist party could, by push-
ing its supporters underground, work to jihadists’ advantage.  
 
 
107 Crisis Group interviews, CTTC official, Dhaka, June 2017; and security analyst, January 2018. 
See also “New JMB’s Shibir connection”, Dhaka Tribune, 17 August 2017. 
108 Crisis Group interviews, Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Chhatra Shibir central leadership, Dhaka 
and Magura, June-August 2017.  
109 Crisis Group interview, Islami Chhatra Shibir finance secretary, Magura, April 2017. 
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VII. Improving the Government’s Response 
A. Reforming the Criminal Justice System 
Law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh rely on brute force in part because the crimi-
nal justice system is enfeebled, with poor investigative capacity, weak prosecutors 
and a paralysing backlog of court cases. This is particularly the case in rural commu-
nities where significant jihadist recruitment takes place and police are poorly paid, 
prone to corruption and lacking in basic training. Together, these factors have allowed 
scores, possibly hundreds, of detained militants to escape punishment.110 
By resorting to extrajudicial methods to overcome these problems, the state plays 
into jihadists’ hands, as such tactics harden popular perceptions of politicisation and 
score settling. A prominent ex-military security analyst said: “If extrajudicial killings 
continue, there is a possibility we will get more and more extremists. They can now say, 
‘we told you there is no rule of law and this is the evidence’”.111 Killing alleged jihadists 
is doubly injurious: it validates this view while impeding intelligence gathering. 
It seems some political leaders would rather continue to use the flawed justice 
system against rivals than reform it. But hampering the ability of the police and 
courts to tackle the threat presented by jihadist groups will almost certainly erode 
the government’s own position. To implement a more effective counter-terrorism 
strategy, it will need to address the causes of its deteriorating criminal justice sys-
tem, notably obsolete investigation methods and resources as well as the failure to 
professionalise police and prosecution agencies.112  
B. Political Reconciliation and Democratic Debate 
Of equal importance, the government ought to redress the acute politicisation that 
has created space for the re-emergence of jihadist movements and hindered efforts 
to tame the threat they pose. That task will require a reorientation of present exclu-
sionary policies. The Awami League, which claims to be the sole political custodian 
of the country’s constitutionally mandated secularism, has painted the opposition 
BNP as having been soft on militancy when in government and now, in opposition, 
reliant on groups such as JeI, which – the government argues – are friendly to or 
even conveyor belts toward jihadism.  
That welter of accusations is dubious on several counts. Certainly, the BNP’s 
track record in office was at best inauspicious; its rule between 2001-2006 saw an 
increase in militant activity (see Section II above). But the Awami League govern-
ment’s marginalisation of the BNP and JeI ahead of the December general election 
is politically motivated. Khaleda Zia’s 8 February conviction and five-year sentence 
for corruption, whose timing suits the Awami League’s electoral planning, could 
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prohibit her from contesting the polls and widen divisions.113 At the same time, the gov-
ernment is making its own concessions to Islamists, notably Hefazat, whose views – 
it opposes the principle of a pluralist, secular democracy; allowing women in the 
workplace; or appointing Hindus to key government posts – are arguably harder-
line than those of JeI.114  
In January 2017, responding to criticism from Hefazat, the government agreed to 
remove contributions by non-Muslim and secular authors in public school textbooks. 
In April, the education ministry agreed to recognise qaumi madrasa higher educa-
tion degrees (known as dawra-e-Hadith) as equivalent to a master’s degree, despite 
the absence of regulation or enforcement of education standards in the madrasas. 
This decision effectively opened to madrasa graduates employment opportunities 
that are closed to others with the same limited formal schooling. The following month, 
Prime Minister Hasina supported Hefazat’s demand to remove a statue of Lady Jus-
tice, which the group deemed un-Islamic, in front of the Supreme Court.115 These 
concessions are effectively giving greater currency to the Hefazat’s hardline exclu-
sionary agenda.  
The government’s targeting of BNP and JeI risks doing jihadist groups a service. 
Not only does it divert police resources from disrupting jihadist recruitment and 
planning. But, in addition, by depriving JeI of legitimate platforms for dissent and 
exposing it to a harsh crackdown, the government might force some JeI activists to 
follow exactly the path it accuses them of taking already – the path toward finding 
common cause with militants. The BNP joint secretary general warned: “Only a return 
to a multiparty democratic space can ensure solutions to rising militancy”.116 Some in 
the Awami League harbour similar misgivings, but the party’s top decision-makers 
fear losing to the BNP in a credible election, which would be the basis of any mean-
ingful engagement between the two parties, and thus prefer the current stalemate.117  
While the Supreme Court decision on the JeI’s participation in elections appears 
for now difficult to reverse, the government’s crackdowns on the party and the BNP 
are counterproductive. Instead, the Awami League would be better served by forging 
consensus with the BNP on how to tackle the threat. Zia’s conviction has made such 
a dialogue even more elusive. Her party, whose activists have already resorted to street 
 
 
113 The chief election commissioner said Zia cannot contest the next general election unless she per-
suades the Supreme Court to overturn her conviction or lessen her sentence. “Khaleda can’t run 
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agitation – which could turn violent – has said it will not field candidates in Decem-
ber if she remains imprisoned; another virtually uncontested election would further 
erode government legitimacy and risk violent BNP-Awami League clashes as in 2014.118  
The Supreme Court could reduce Zia’s sentence on appeal to less than two years, 
thus removing any prohibition on her own electoral candidacy. Whatever the outcome 
of the appeal, in the interest of social peace, the Awami League should withdraw 
politically motivated corruption and criminal charges against Zia and other senior 
BNP officeholders and stop the repression of their supporters. The BNP should urge 
its cadres to exercise restraint, rather than turning to violence, and craft a compro-
mise with the government. The alternative is continued confrontation and zero-sum 
politics that will increase the risks of another deeply contested election, with jihadists 
potentially taking advantage of any ensuing crisis or violence.  
C. Curbing Recruitment: Engaging Bangladesh’s Youth 
Police officers, lawyers, and others who have interacted with jihadists contend that 
large numbers of militants are drawn to jihadist ideas online prior to joining violent 
groups.119 That said, there is little credible research on what drives recruitment or on 
the profile of those recruited, beyond approximate age group (15-35) and broad geo-
graphic location (with a heavy concentration in northern regions). Indeed, recruits 
show enormous diversity: from madrasa students to upper middle-class youth at 
private universities. A senior counter-terrorism official admitted: “We are struggling 
to disrupt recruitment”.120  
The government has adopted some strategies beyond law enforcement to counter 
the appeal of jihadism. Its approach includes public awareness campaigns and train-
ing muezzins (mosque preachers) to give anti-militancy sermons at Friday prayers.121 
But the effectiveness of such measures remains unproven and, in any case, they are 
inconsistently implemented.  
Little has been done to regulate the qaumi madrasas, which teach around 1.4 mil-
lion students in rural and other economically deprived areas, and which continue to 
supply a potential, if limited, pool of recruits and sympathisers.122 Aliya madrasas 
are largely state-funded and registered under the government-mandated Bangladesh 
Madrasa Education Board, which also designs curricula, holds exams and contracts 
textbook production. In contrast, the qaumi sector evades government supervision, 
even as security officials suggest tighter monitoring. The Awami League government’s 
decision to formally recognise a qaumi madrasa degree as equivalent to a master’s 
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121 The government has inter-ministerial committees instructing various ministries, including reli-
gious affairs, culture, information, education and law, to conduct counter-extremism campaigns. 
Ministry records suggest that Friday sermons against militancy have been delivered at over 300,000 
mosques. Prominent international clerics have been invited to speak against radicalisation, and doc-
umentaries and television advertisements with the same message have been aired. Crisis Group in-
terviews, government officials, Dhaka, August 2017.  
122 “Modernisation of madrasa education in Bangladesh: a strategy paper”, Bangladesh Enterprise 
Institute, June 2011. 
Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°295, 28 February 2018 Page 23 
 
 
 
 
 
degree only makes these seminaries more attractive.123 To be sure, the vast majority 
of madrasa students do not turn to jihadism, but the lack of government regulation 
allows for the promotion of sectarian intolerance and, in some cases, even incitement 
to violence. Until there is greater state oversight over the madrasa curriculum, the 
government should rescind its master’s degree decision.  
The challenge goes well beyond the madrasa sector, though. Private university 
campuses like North South’s have also seen students drawn to jihadism, whereupon 
they have perpetrated some of the most lethal attacks at home and/or travelled to 
join ISIS in Iraq and Syria.124 Yet security agencies appear far more focused on coun-
tering opposition to the government than disrupting jihadism recruitment on cam-
puses. While political polarisation deepens and the partisan crackdowns on the 
Awami League’s rivals continue, that is likely to remain the case.  
 
 
123 Crisis Group interview, Awami League advisory council member, Dhaka, June 2017. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
Although there was no major attack in 2017, the potential for further jihadist violence 
in Bangladesh remains. The resurgence of jihadist groups over the past few years has 
been facilitated if not accelerated by years of political deadlock. While there is no 
direct line between toxic politics and the rise of jihadist violence, a bitterly divided 
polity, between those espousing secularism and those emphasising Bangladesh’s 
Muslim identity, and a brutal and highly partisan policing and justice system, none-
theless has opened space for jihadist groups. The politicised trials of senior JeI lead-
ers contributed to the environment in which Ansar emerged. The BNP’s alliance with 
the JeI, whose activists, along with BNP cadres, have been responsible for much of 
the worst political violence since 2013, raises understandable concerns. Yet that vio-
lence was provoked by the attempt to drive JeI underground, itself the byproduct of 
a zero-sum game between the two largest parties.  
Ending the deadlock is even more urgent today as Bangladesh confronts a new 
generation of potentially more dangerous jihadists with apparent links to transna-
tional terror groups such as ISIS. Instead, Sheikh Hasina’s government has made no 
serious attempt to reconcile with the mainstream opposition, opting instead to waste 
police resources on repression of opponents. This choice has undermined both de-
mocracy and security, with countrywide violence bringing the country to a standstill 
for months at a time. Given the jihadist revival since then, another breakdown of law 
and order would almost certainly play into the hands of groups like Ansar and JMB. 
If the government does not change course, such forces may experience another 
resurgence.  
Brussels, 28 February 2018 
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